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AMNESTY IN THE NIGER DELTA: VERTICAL 
MOVEMENT TOWARDS SELF-DETERMINATION OR 
LATERAL POLICY SHIFT? 
 




The inhabitants of Nigeria’s oil-rich Delta region have engaged the State in long-drawn disputes 
over the ownership and control of oil resources and revenues. While the country’s Constitution vests 
the absolute ownership and control of oil resources as well as the distribution of oil revenues in the 
federal government, the Niger Delta communities claim that they are entitled to participate in the 
industry that exploits resources from their environment. Simply, they claim that the country’s extant 
laws and the actions of the federal government infringe on their rights to self-determination. The 
conflicting stance is one of the fundamental causes of violent conflicts that have besieged the region; 
particularly in the last decade. Coming off the backdrop of peaceful struggles of the Ogoni peoples 
considered to be largely ineffectual in achieving the desired objectives, ethnic groups have embraced 
militancy as a means to force the government and oil-multinationals reckon with their demand for 
self-determination. The consequent breakdown of law and order in the region and the impacts of 
shortages in production prompted the federal government to initiate the amnesty initiative in June 
2009. Under the amnesty programme, militants were offered a presidential pardon, training 
opportunities, promises of infrastructure development in the region and direct payments of oil revenues 
to host-communities. This paper seeks to examine the recent developments vis-à-vis the government’s 
amnesty initiative to determine if this policy has bridged the gap in the longstanding self-
determination demands of the Niger Delta communities. 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Nigeria is blessed with abundant human and natural resources, and is one of 
the major producers of crude oil. The country possesses the requisite potentials – 
human and natural resources – to be economically developed. However, this is not 
the case as the development potentials of the country has been hindered by political 
instability, macroeconomic challenges, inconsistent policy regimes to mention a few 
that have been in some way instigated by the discovery and/or the conflicts over the 
ownership, management and access to oil resources (and revenues). Crude oil was 
discovered in commercial quantities in 1956 in Oloibiri town located in the Niger 
Delta region, which for the purpose of this paper refers to all the oil-producing states 
in Nigeria.1 To put the natural resource qualities of the Niger Delta in perspective, 
the area is one of the largest deltas in the world;2 the third largest mangrove in the 
world;3 world’s largest wetlands;4 and, the most extensive fresh water swamp forests 
                                                
* Dr. Rhuks Temitope AKO (correspondence author), Lecturer, University of Hull Laws School, 
England; R.Ako@hull.ac.uk and Ohiocheoya OMIUNU, Doctoral Candidate at the University of 
Liverpool Law School, England. 
1 Currently, this includes nine of 36 states: Akwa- Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, Rivers, Ondo, Edo, Cross 
Rivers, Imo and Abia. Section 2 (1) (b) of the Niger Delta Development Commission Act, Chapter 
N68, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004.  
2 -- ‘Niger River Delta’ <http://www.worldwildlife.org/wildworld/profiles/g200/g155.html> 
accessed 01 December 2007.  
3 Human Rights Watch Report, ‘The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights 
Violations in Nigeria’s Oil Producing Communities’, HRW Index No. 1-56432-225-4 (1999), p. 49.  
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in west and central Africa.5 The region which holds 60-80% of all Nigerian plant and 
animal species,6 in addition to its oil reserves has been of immense importance to the 
national and global economy.7 Notably, since crude-oil was discovered in commercial 
quantities, the resource has become the mainstay of Nigeria’s economy.8   
Till date, the ownership, management of oil resources and the distribution of 
accruing revenues have instigated more acrimony than development to the Nigeria 
and is the fundamental reason why the host-communities (in the Niger Delta) have 
been restive. Essentially, the host-communities argue that because they are a minority 
in the complex federalism, they unfairly bear the detrimental impacts of the oil 
exploitation without commensurate benefits.9 To register their discontent with the 
status quo; that is, their exclusion from the oil industry generally, the host-
communities have resulted to various form of protests – peaceful and violent – over 
the years. In the last decade, militant expressions of violence characterized the 
protests against the oil industry exploited by oil-multinationals corporations 
(OMNCs) and the Federal Government (FG). Militia groups that have developed 
mainly from ethnic youth organizations are now at the forefront of the movement to 
‘emancipate’ the Niger Delta from the clutches of the oil-industry’s operators (and 
managers). Following the perceived failures of peaceful protests, ethnic groups 
(mainly youths) from the Delta organized themselves into militant organizations that 
have adopted more forceful means to register their grouses against the oil industry. 
These networks of organized ethnic groups have engaged in what may best be 
qualified as militant insurgency and routinely attacked government security forces 
(either pro-actively or in retaliation) and oil installations.10 The grave local and global 
consequences of militancy in the Niger Delta region necessitated a fresh approach to 
tackle restiveness in the Niger Delta region.11   
Consequently, after several years of militancy and reduced oil production in 
the Niger Delta region, the FG opted to pursue an alternative to its failed ‘security’ 
option by initiating the amnesty program. Briefly, the amnesty initiative is a process 
of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) for individuals and 
promises of infrastructural development for the region. The FG offered all who 
                                                                                                                                
4  R. Rangley ‘International River Basin Organization in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Technical Paper 250 
(World Bank, Washington D.C. 1994). 
5 D. Moffat and O. Linden, ‘Perception and Reality: Assessing Priorities for Sustainable Development 
in the Niger River Delta’ (1995) 24 Ambio 7-8.  
6 N.J. Ashton-Jones and O.N. Douglas, Report to Statoil (Nigeria) Ltd.: Baseline Ecological Survey of 
the Niger Delta, 1994, p. 29, quoted in K. Ebeku, Oil and the Niger Delta People in International Law: 
Resource Rights, Environmental and Equity Issues, Rudiger Koppe Verlag, Germany 2006, p. 130. 
7 See generally, R. Ako and P. Okonmah, ‘Minority Rights Issues in Nigeria: A Theoretical Analysis of 
Historical and Contemporary Conflicts in the Oil-Rich Niger Delta Region’, (2009) 16 International 
Journal on Minority and group Rights 1, 53-65. The paper highlights the significance of the trade in palm-
oil and crude-oil from the Niger Delta to the global economy.   
8 See generally, I. Gary and T. Karl, Bottom of the Barrel: Africa's Oil Boom and the Poor (Baltimore: 
Catholic Relief Services, 2003). 
9 See generally: R. Ako and P. Okonmah, (note 8); R. Ako, ‘Nigeria’s Land Use Act: An Anti-Thesis to 
Environmental Justice’, (2009) 53 Journal of African Law 2, 289–304; C. Obi, ‘Globalization and Local 
Resistance: The Case of the Ogoni versus Shell’ (1997) 2 New Political Economy 1, 137-48; and E. 
Osaghae, ‘The Ogoni Uprising: Oil Politics, Minority Agitation and the Future of the Nigerian State’ 
(1995) 94 African Affairs 376, 325-344. 
10 R. Ako, ‘The Struggle for Resource Control and Violence in the Niger Delta’ in . Obi and S. Rustad 
(eds.) Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petro-Violence (London: Zed 
Books, 2011), 46. 
11 See generally, C. Obi and S. Rustad (eds.) Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex 
Politics of Petro-Violence (London: Zed Books, 2011). This volume discusses contemporary issues all 
related to the Niger Delta crisis, the failure to resolve them thus far and prospects for the future. 
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accepted the deal presidential pardons and other incentives including training 
opportunities and payment of monthly allowances in return for submission of arms 
and ammunitions and renouncing violence. Apparently, a large number of militants 
accepted the amnesty deal but a few pockets of defiant militant groups who 
doubt(ed) the sincerity of the government’s ignored it. While the debate on the 
efficacy of the amnesty deal rages on, this paper seeks to ascertain the impact of the 
amnesty initiative on the clamour for self-determination - which in the view of this 
paper is the fundamental basis upon which all the demands of the Niger Delta 
people is hinged – and therefore a demand which must be taken into cognizance to 
effectively minimize oil-related conflicts in the region.  
To this end, it is the objective of this paper to examine the effects and 
implications of the federal government’s amnesty initiative on the clamour for self-
determination in the Niger Delta Region. To achieve this objective, this paper is 
divided into five sections including this introduction. The second section highlights 
the origin and evolution of the concept of self-determination under international law 
with emphasis on economic self-determination; a variant of the concept which 
reflects the clamour of the Niger Delta people over the years for control of the 
resources harnessed from the region. The third section traces the historical 
antecedents of the Niger Delta peoples’ clamour for economic self-determination 
while the fourth highlights the amnesty deal as proffered by the federal government 
in perspective. The fifth section analyses the amnesty deal to determine whether it 
measures up to the Niger Delta region’s longstanding demands for economic self-
determination in conclusion.  
 
2.1 Self-Determination and the Ownership and Control of Natural 
Resources under International Law  
The right to self-determination is expressly recognized globally via the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ICESCR) which both entered into force in 
1976.12 Article 1 of both the ICCPR13 and ICESCR14 provide that:  
 
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.  
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth 
and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international 
economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and 
international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence.  
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having 
responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust 
                                                
12 The African Charter for Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) also contains express provisions that 
guarantee peoples’ rights to self-determination. In particular, Article 21 states:  
(1) All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be 
exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it.  
(2) In case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of 
its property as well as to an adequate compensation. 
13 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49.  
14 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 
2200A (XXI) 
of 16 December 1966 entry into force 3 January 1976, in accordance with article 27. 
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Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, 
and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter 
of the United Nations. 
 
Self-determination; as a recognizable international concept, originated after 
the First World War after it was explicitly embraced by US President Woodrow 
Wilson, by Lenin and others, and became the guiding principle for the reconstruction 
of Europe following World War I.15 Self-determination was understood differently 
by the USA and Western Europe as popular sovereignty, individual freedom and 
representative government, while Eastern and Central Europe considered it as based 
on the notion of nationalism.16  
The United Nations (UN) Charter made a couple of general references to 
‘self-determination’17 as a political principle.18 The status of self-determination 
developed in 1960 following the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples adopted by the UN General 
Assembly (GA) which states ‘all peoples have the right to self-determination; by 
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development’.19 In 1970, following the wide adoption 
of the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the UN,20 the 
concept of self-determination further developed and arguably became recognized as 
jus cogens thus a source of international law.21 It has been argued that given the 
unanimity of the adoption of the Resolution, the notion of self-determination should 
be considered as a reflection of international custom or state practice which enjoy 
higher ranking amongst the sources of International law.22 Also, Self-determination is 
now recognized as an integral part of human rights law which has a universal 
application and is a necessary condition for the enjoyment of other human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.23  For this reason, it is not surprising that where a state 
denies a group asserting its right to self-determination, armed conflicts result as in 
the case in Nigeria’s Delta region which is the focus of this paper. Historically, the 
quest for political self-determination; influenced by the high spate of decolonization, 
secessions and general feelings of national consciousness which characterized the 
                                                
15 M. van Praag and O. Seroo, ‘The Implementation of the Right to Self-Determination as a 
Contribution to Conflict Prevention’ Report of the International Conference of Experts held in 
Barcelona from 21-27 November 1998, online: 
http://www.unpo.org/downloads/THE%20IMPLEMENTATION%20OF%20THE%20RIGHT%
20TO%20SELF.pdf 
16 T Musgrave p. 13 
17 Article 1(2) and Article 55.  
18 M. van Praag and O. Seroo, (note 16) 
19 Article 2 of UN General Assembly (GA) Resolution 1514 adopted at the 947th plenary meeting held 
on 14 December 1960. 
20 Resolution 2625 by the UNGA.  
21 Article 38 of the Statute of International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
22 B. Cop and D. Eymirlioglu, ‘The Right Of Self-Determination in International Law towards the 40th 
Anniversary of the Adoption of ICCPR And ICESCR’,  
http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume10/winter2005/Cop-Eymirlioglu.pdf.  
M Bulajic, Principle of International Development Law: Progressive Development of the Principles of International 
Law relating to the New International Order, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), 263. 
23 M. van Praag and O. Seroo, (note 19) 
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international system since the end of the Second World War, has been most 
prominent in the past 50 years.24  
That notwithstanding, economic self-determination also gained prominence 
after the end of hostilities of the Second World War even if its propagation has been 
suppressed in the post-Cold War era.25 Generally, economic self-determination; in its 
contemporary understanding, refers to a people’s capacity to dispose freely of natural 
resources in accordance with democratically-taken decisions.26 The quest for a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) within the UN played a significant role in the 
development of economic self-determination27 which Farmer describes as the 
‘existing conversation between a government and its peoples’.28 Thus, even though 
economic self-determination was considered an appendage to political self-
determination for all practical purposes, the concept can operate independently of 
secessionary movements.29 The situation in the Niger Delta where inhabitants of the 
region are clamouring for ‘economic self-determination’ without necessarily looking 
to secede from Nigeria lends credence to this assertion.30 The movement of newly 
independent states to establish their political independence as well as concurrently 
ascertain their economic dependence from their previous colonial governments may 
explain the consideration that though economic self-determination was considered 
an appendage to political self-determination it still has a distinctive existence on its 
own.31  
Returning to the core of economic self-determination; which is the internal 
struggle for control of resources between a State and ‘peoples’ or the ‘antagonism 
between claims to self-determination and to state sovereignty’, it must be noted that 
the attitude of the State to claims (of economic self-determination) determines the 
outcomes. Where the State completely denies the groups claim, as experienced in 
Nigeria which this paper focuses upon, there is a higher probability that violent 
conflicts will ensue.  
However, claims to economic self-determination do not necessarily lead to 
violence as there are several avenues to resolve such claims depending on the 
situations, needs, interests and conditions of concerned parties.32 However, claims 
for economic self-determination often fuel armed conflicts because there are few 
well defined procedures for adjudication of claims for self-determination or for their 
implementation.33 In the same vein, the resultant violent conflicts are dealt with 
differently by States in which they occur. What is clear though is that self-
determination should not be viewed as a one-time choice, but as an on-going process 
which ensures the continuance of a people's participation in decision making and 
                                                
24 A. Farmer, ‘Towards A Meaningful Rebirth of Economic Self-Determination: Human Rights 
Realization in Resource-Rich Countries’, (2007) 39 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 417, 423. 
25 ibid  
26 For a comprehensive discussion of the evolution of economic self-determination, see A. Farmer, 
ibid, 418.  
27 See generally The Declaration on the establishment of a New International Economic Order, (Res. 
3201/S-VI) < http://www.un-documents.net/s6r3201.htm> accessed 27 July 2010; see generally E 
Laszlo and Others, ‘The Objectives of the New International Economic Order’ (Pergamon press, 
New York 1978) 159 - 168 
28 A. Farmer, (note 27) 421.  
29 ibid 
30 For instance the Kaiama Declaration. See section 5.1 below.  
31 A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: University Press, 1995), 49. 




control over its own destiny.34 In Nigeria where demands for self-determination 
from the inhabitants of the oil-rich Niger Delta region have led to violent conflicts, 
the federal government has initiated several (failed) initiatives to address the 
demands. The latest of these initiatives; the amnesty deal has succeeded, even if 
momentarily, in reducing the spate of violent conflicts in the region. The following 
section highlights the genealogy of the clamour for economic self-determination of 
the Niger Delta people that culminated in violent conflicts.  
 
3.1 A Genealogy of the Economic Self Determination Clamour by the 
Niger Delta people. 
The Niger-Delta problem has been described as an accumulation of years of 
neglect to the anomalies’ which have been perpetuated in the region since the 
discovery of crude oil in the region in 1956.35 The clamour for economic self-
determination in the Niger Delta may be analysed within four time-lines - pre-
independence till 1978, 1979-1989, 1990-1998 and 1999-2009. The first period 
represents the early periods of Nigeria’s oil industry when the resource was 
discovered in commercial quantities and a flurry of legislation followed to transfer 
ownership of oil resources that originally belonged to host-communities36 to the 
federal government. Indeed, oil resources belonged to the host-communities up till 
1916 when the British Colonial Government appropriated the ownership of all oil 
resources via the Mineral Oil Ordinance37 which later became vested in the federal 
government, the progeny of the Crown.38 By the time oil was discovered in 
commercial quantities in Oloibiri, ownership of the resource was vested in the 
federal government. It is argued that the struggle for economic self-determination 
began during this period when the Ijaws39 made representations to the Willink 
Commission that was appointed by the British government to enquire in to the fears 
of the minorities and allay them in preparation for political independence. Although 
oil was not expressly mentioned during the Commission’s deliberations, it is not 
farfetched to suggest that oil was a consideration (however trivial) in the minds of 
the Ijaws who expressed their fears that they would be dominated by economically 
and otherwise the main ethnic groups.40 Given the limitation of the Commission’s 
terms of reference to ‘ascertain facts about the fears of minorities…’41 it is unlikely; 
with oil being an undeveloped resource at the time, that speculatory assertions would 
have been entertained by the Commission.  
                                                
34 ibid 
35 C. Ukeje, ‘Changing the Paradigm of Pacification: Oil and Militarization in Nigeria’s Delta Region’, 
in C. Obi and S. Rustad (eds.) Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petro-
Violence (London: Zed Books, 2011), 85. 
36 See, section 5 of the Mining Regulation (Oil) Ordinance of 1907, C.O. 588/ 2: Southern Nigeria 
Certified Ordinances, 1906-1907. By the provisions of this law, the colonial government assumed 
ownership of oil only after the Governor entered into agreement with any Native Authority ‘for the 
purchase of full and exclusive rights in and over all mineral oils within and under any lands which are 
the property of any Native Community’. 
37 Section 3(1) Mineral Oil Ordinance 1916. 
38 See generally, the Petroleum Act, P10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN), 2004; Territorial 
Waters Act, Chapter T4 LFN 2004; Exclusive Economic Zone Act, Chapter E17 LFN 2004; and, the 
Minerals and Mining Act, Chapter M12 LFN 2004. 
39 The Ijaws are the fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria and are the major ethnic group in the Niger 
Delta region. 
40 Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into fears of Minorities and the means of allaying 
them’ (Willink Commission), C.O.957/4, Colonial Office, July 1958, 16-17. 
41 Ibid, iii. 
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Interestingly, subsequent events arising from the recommendations of the 
Willink Commission contributed to instigating the first oil-related crisis in Nigeria in 
1966; barely six years after independence. The Willink Commission had In 
recognition of the fears of the Ijaws recommended the establishment of a board; the 
Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB), to speedily develop the ‘poor, backward 
and neglected’ region.42 The performance of the NDDB, or lack thereof, as well as 
the host-communities’ early frustrations with the growing oil-industry led Adaka 
Boro and his Niger Delta Volunteer Force to declare a Niger Delta Peoples Republic 
with the intent that the ‘Republic’ would control its resources. The revolution was 
short-lived as it was quashed twelve days later by the military. However, the seeds of 
economic self-determination had been sown and a year later, Nigeria was plunged 
into civil war that was ostensibly precipitated by the quest for self-determination.43 
The war, largely considered to have been more of a battle to control the oil 
fields of the Niger Delta than to maintain the unity of the nation,44 was described 
aptly by Soremekun and Obi as a ‘struggle for the physical possession of the oil 
wealth in the Niger Delta between factions of the domestic ruling class on the one 
hand, and between the Eastern faction and the producing areas on the other hand’.45 
Following the conclusion of the war in 1970, the Federal Military Government made 
sweeping changes to the administration of the country and the oil industry. While the 
country was decentralized as a means to neutralize the possible recurrence of the 
Biafra experience, the federal government re-affirmed its legal ownership and control 
of oil resources and revenues by promulgating several decrees including the 
Petroleum Act,46 Oil in Navigable Waters Act,47 Oil Pipelines Act48 and the Offshore 
Revenues Act.49  
The promulgation of the Land Use Act in 1978 marked a watershed in the 
development of Nigeria’s oil industry and changed local perspectives with regards 
the oil industry in the second timeframe lasting between 1979 till 1998. Basically, the 
Act abrogated communal ownership of land and vested same in the government50 
thereby excluding the host-communities from participating in the oil-industry while 
instigating and/or exacerbating oil-related environmental injustices.51  Particularly, 
the resultant economic hardships increased the frustration in the oil communities 
and contributed to a resurgence of violence; albeit on a smaller scale compared to the 
previous secession attempts as inhabitants from the region protested against the legal 
framework and its impacts, especially their economic subjugation. However, claims 
for economic self-determination at this time though widespread were poorly 
organized protests by sections of the Niger Delta society such as youth, women and 
ethnic organizations which were largely ineffectual. Unsurprisingly, the official 
                                                
42 Ibid, 94. 
43 C. Uche, ‘Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War’, (2008) 49 Journal of African History 122-
123. 
44 See generally, I Okonta and O Douglas, Where Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Rights and Oil (Verso, 
London 2003) 33; and, A Oyefusi, ‘Oil Dependence and Civil Conflict in Nigeria’, (2007) CSAE 
WPS/2007-09, online: <www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2007-09text.pdf> accessed 30 
October, 2009.   
45 K Soremekun and C Obi, ‘The Changing Pattern of Foreign Investment in the Nigerian Oil 
Industry’ (1993) 18 Africa Development 3, 14. 
46 Chapter P10  
47 Chapter O6 LFN 2004.  
48 Chapter O7 LFN 2004.  
49 Decree No. 9 of 1971. 
50 Section 1 of the Land Use Act, Chapter L10 LFN 2004. 
51 See generally, R. Ako, (note 10) 289–304. 
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reaction to communal restiveness in the Niger Delta during this period was 
expressed by Chief Phillip Asiodu thus: ‘(Given) the small size of and population (of 
oil-producing communities) it is not cynical to observe that even if the resentment ... 
continues they cannot threaten the stability of the country nor affect its continued 
economic development.’52  
The 1990s witnessed a new wave of organizational dexterity in the Niger 
Delta communities with the formation and influential growth of the Movement for 
the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). MOSOP effectively reached out to its 
primary constituents; the Ogoni people, and teamed up with several local and 
international Non-Governmental Organizations working in the area of human and 
environmental rights protection to advance their claims to economic self-
determination53 amongst others. These organizations provided MOSOP the financial 
and logistic support it required to launch a largely successful campaign against the oil 
companies and the federal government which included the termination of oil 
exploration and production activities in Ogoniland by 1993.54 Other communities in 
the Niger Delta reshaped their campaigns against the oil industry based on the largely 
successful MOSOP model as they adopted Bills of Rights which included their 
demands for economic self-determination.55 This period also witnessed an increase in 
violent conflicts as kidnapping, hostage taking of oil-company workers, and the 
occupation, disruption and vandalization of oil installations and facilities by (mainly) 
youths form the host-communities became rife.56 The government’s crackdown on 
restive communities including the hanging of the Ogoni Nine exacerbated the state 
of anomie and strife in the Niger Delta which assumed a new dimension following 
the expiration of the Ijaw ultimatum that oil companies withdraw from their land by 
30 December 1998.57  
The final timeline (1999-2009) in examining the development of the Niger 
Delta’s claims to economic self-determination was predominantly shaped by two 
events; the government’s unabated attempts to crush MOSOP and the Ijaw Youth 
Council (IYC)58 leadership and the return to democratic governance after decades of 
military dictatorships.59 According to Ikelegbe, the former ‘paved way for a discourse 
that clearly expressed frustration with the failure of non-violent protests to gain the 
attention of the government and oil-companies and get them to respond to the 
demands of the people’ and coupled with the later, ‘gave vent to, and provided 
resources for, more militant forms of resistance’.60 During this period, militancy in 
the Niger Delta region blossomed as several youth militia groups that had been 
granted access to arms and ammunitions by political godfathers that later dumped 
                                                
52 C Ukeje, ‘Oil Communities and Political Violence: the Case of Ethnic Ijaws in Nigeria’s Delta 
Region’, (2001) 13 Terrorism and Political Violence 4, 15. 
53 In local parlance, the Ogonis and other ethnic nationalities of the Niger Delta were (and still are) 
agitating for resource control. For a discussion on resource control in the Niger Delta, see generally, 
R. Ako, (note 11) 42-54. 
54 M Fleshman, ‘The International Community and the Crisis in Nigeria’s Oil Producing 
Communities: A Perspective on the US Role’, (2001) 61 ACAS Bulletin, 6.  
55 C Ukeje, (note 53) 24-25. 
56 ibid, 16. 
57 A. Ikelegbe, ‘Popular and Criminal Violence as Instruments of Struggle in the Niger Delta’ in Obi 
and S. Rustad (eds.) Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petro-Violence 
(London: Zed Books, 2011), 127. 
58 The IYC had organized Ijaws and produced the Kaiama Declaration on 11 December 1998 which 
expressed their grievances against the oil-industry and claims to self-determination.   
59 A. Ikelegbe, (note 58) 127. 
60 Ibid. 
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them, turned their attention to the ‘emancipation’ of the oil-rich but impoverished 
region.61  
Recourse to violence was further entrenched after a deceit-laden peace 
agreement was made by (then) President Obasanjo in 2004 to stop the two main 
militant leaders at the time; Tom Atake and Asari Dokubo, from carrying out their 
threat to join forces against the State and oil-companies.62 The conditions included 
the surrender of arms for money, provision of vocational training for fighters. With 
peace secured on the short-term by the accord, the funding to see it through 
remained in the ‘pipelines’ with consequences including the escalation of violent 
expressions of economic self-determination with the entry of the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).63 MEND transformed the struggle for 
the economic self-determination of the Niger Delta as with their astute (and faceless) 
organization, deft planning and operational dexterity as the consequences of their 
well-publicized threats of, and operations, reverberated globally. State attempts to 
quell violent expressions of the demand for economic self-determination including 
increased funding to the region via derivation and abolition of the inshore/offshore 
dichotomy, convening of a National Political Reforms Conference (NPRC) and the 
establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) all failed to 
quell the momentum in the Niger Delta region. 
The government’s (mis)management – the failure of the above incentives 
amongst others – also contributed to the escalation of the Niger Delta peoples’ 
resolve to maintain their violent expressions for economic self-determination. For 
instance, although the new Constitution provides that at least 13% of oil revenues be 
paid to the Niger Delta region,64 President Obasanjo delayed the payments and when 
he made them, there were several illegal deductions made therefrom.65 The President 
abolished the onshore/offshore dichotomy to avoid imminent escalation of violence 
in the region that could have derided the (then) impending 2003 elections. The 
NPRC; the government’s compromise to the agitation mainly from the Niger Delta 
area for a national sovereign conference (SNC) to decide the future relationship 
between the oil-rich region and the rest of the country, failed to record any 
significant gains in this regards. Rather, the president used this as an opportunity to 
highlight his feelings that the Niger Delta region is inconsequential in the political 
configuration of the country.66 As with previous development boards set-up to 
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speed-up the development process in the Niger Delta, the NDDC did not perform 
to the expectations of the region.67 It is instructive to note that MEND accused the 
federal government of displaying lack of seriousness with its development plan for 
the region which failed to address their demand for the control of their resources.68 
It is based on the foregoing that militant groups; particularly MEND, stepped up 
their violent expression of economic self-determination that culminated in the 
President Yar’Adua government’s amnesty initiative to rid the region of the endemic 
violence.69   
 
4.1 The Amnesty Deal  
Amnesty, in the general sense, is a political tool of compromise and reunion 
granted by a sovereign to individuals that have committed acts against the State; 
usually treasonable offences and/or rebellion. O’Shea who defines amnesty as 
immunity in law from either criminal or civil legal consequences, or from both, for 
wrongs committed in the past in a political context opines that granting of amnesty 
implores the following: 
1. That its grantee has committed some form of offence which is identifiable 
and punishable under some national criminal legal system or in other cases a 
crime recognised and punishable under international law.  
2. That the granting authority forgoes all legal sanctions or remembrance of the 
offence(s) committed by the offender. 
3. That the grantees are given a clean slate in the eyes of the law.70 
 
In essence, amnesty could be summarised as a trade off on justice in the interest 
transition, peace, reconciliation, forgiveness and truth.71 Peace in the Niger Delta was 
the major factor for the initiation of the amnesty programme in Nigeria as it is a 
crucial element to ensure the optimal exploitation of oil resources required to satisfy 
varied interests including the federal government and oil-multinationals that 
pecuniary interests and the global community that requires a steady supply of the 
resource. This section outlines the federal government’s amnesty initiative that was 
calculated to reduce the spates of violence emanating from the Niger Delta region 
where the inhabitants were expressing their desire for economic self-determination 
specifically to determine if, and to what extent, these demands were (or, are capable 
of being) satisfied. 
                                                                                                                                
article posted on the NPRC website on July 25, 2005; available at:  <www.nprc-
online.org/ab_8900136.html.> accessed 20 February 2006. 
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The origin of the amnesty initiative lies in the recommendations of the Niger 
Delta Technical Committee (NDTC) that was inaugurated on 8 September, 2008 by 
the federal government whose terms of reference were: 
• To collate, review and distil the various reports, suggestions and 
recommendations on the Niger Delta from the Willink Commission Report 
(1958) to the present, and give a summary of the recommendations necessary 
for government action. 
• To appraise the summary recommendations and present a detailed short, 
medium and long term suggestion to the challenges in the Niger Delta. 
• To make and present to Government any other recommendations that will 
help the Federal Government achieve sustainable development, peace, 
human and environmental security in the Niger Delta region. 
The NDTC proposal identified the three main issues as constraints to sustainable 
peace and development in the Niger Delta that require reforms to include issues of 
governance and the rule of law, socio-economic development, and human 
development.  
The Committee made far-reaching proposals on each of these and with 
specific reference to stemming the tide of resurgent violence in the region, it 
recommended the application international standards of disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of militants as prescribed in the United 
Nations Integrated DDR Standards.72 It suggested that the federal government  
1. Establish a credible and authoritative DDR institution and process 
including international negotiators to plan, implement, and oversee the DDR 
programmes at regional, state and local government levels; 
2. Provide for open trial and release on bail (with a view to eventual release) 
of Henry Okah and others involved in struggles relating to the Region;  
3. Grant amnesty to all Niger Delta militants willing and ready to participate 
in the DDR programme;  
4. Address short term issues arising from amnesty to militants, by promoting 
security for ex-militants and rebuilding of communities destroyed by military 
invasion;  
5. Work out long-term strategies of human capacity development and 
reintegration for ex-militants; 
6. Reflect on a time-line with adequate funds for the DDR programme to 
take place;  
7. Stop the illegal demands put on youths from the Region by prosecuting 
the suppliers of small arms and light weapons and also those involved in oil 
bunkering by identifying highly placed persons in and outside of government 
who are engaged in sponsoring violence for economic and political reasons;  
8. Exclude from amnesty and criminalise the activities of those militants not 
committed to the DDR process and unwilling to surrender their arms;  
9. Ensure that signatories to the DDR programme show clear commitment 
to the entire process. 73 
 
On June 25, 2009, the Federal Government announced the amnesty deal. 
According to the President, the offer of amnesty was predicated on the willingness 
and readiness of the militants to give up all illegal arms in their possession, 
completely renounce militancy in all its ramifications unconditionally, and depose an 
                                                




undertaking to this effect.74 A summary of the main terms of the amnesty offer 
included:  
• an unconditional offer of forgiveness for all militants who accept the offer, 
willingly surrender their weapons and embrace dialogue with a view to broker 
peace in the region;  
• rehabilitation programmes, education and/or training touching on the 
physical and psychological re-orientation of their ideologies so as to create a 
re-focused group of people who would be better able to tackle the challenges 
and issues militating against their communities in particular and Nigeria in 
general;  
• pecuniary entitlements of N65,000 (US $841) paid to each militant monthly 
as feeding allowance and stipend for the duration of the rehabilitation 
process.75  
The president gave a 60-day window from date of announcement of the offer within 
which interested militants were to take up this offer. On the expiration of the 
deadline, about 15,000 ex-militants reportedly surrendered themselves and caches of 
weaponry to accept the amnesty deal.76  
The government also made promises to the region including a new regional 
railway project, the LNG projects, new refinery projects, new town projects, 
environmental remediation projects and the crucial east-west road projects as well as 
other coastal roads in the zone. In addition to contributing to the infrastructural 
development of the region, the government intends for these projects to be an 
avenue to offer gainful employment opportunities to the thousands of ex-militants 
that benefit from the skills acquisition and training programmes.77 The federal 
government also committed to transfer 10 per cent equity of its oil and gas ventures 
directly to oil-producing communities (thereby bypassing the state governors) in the 
Niger Delta but reneged on this citing contentious legal issue.78 Instead, the 
government intends to share dividends from the oil-industry amongst host-
communities based on the value of assets in their areas.  
 
5.1 Amnesty: Lateral or Vertical Policy Shift?    
Having highlighted the amnesty and post-amnesty promises made by the 
government in response to the violent expression of the Niger Delta region’s 
peoples’, we examine what extent these promises meet the demands of the Niger 
Delta indigenes’ for economic self-determination. The demands as contained in the 
Ijaw peoples’ Kaiama Declaration are used as the reference point in this section. 
There are three reasons for this choice; first the Ijaws are the majority group in the 
region, MEND is comprised mainly of Ijaws and the Bills of Rights that emanated 
                                                
74 A Chinweoke, V Enebele and A Onwuka, ‘The terms of amnesty, by Yar’Adua’, Vanguard 
Newspaper (Nigeria) 17 October 2009.  
75 ‘FG approves N10.14bn for amnesty’ Daily Triumph Newspaper (Nigeria) 09 October 2009. See 
also, S Ologun, ‘Amnesty to cost N10b’, The Nation Newspapers (Nigeria), 09 October 2009.  
76 C. Obi and S. Rustad, ‘Conclusion: Amnesty and Post-Amnesty Peace, Is the Window of 
Opportunity Closing for the Niger Delta?’ in C. Obi and S. Rustad (eds.) Oil and Insurgency in the Niger 
Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petro-Violence (London: Zed Books, 2011), 204.   
77 C. Ajunwa, ‘Nigeria: Fed. Govt Approves 6,166 Ex-Militants for Amnesty’, Codewit News, 29 
November 2010, <http://www.codewit.com/north-america/2338-nigeria-fed-govt-approves-6166-
ex-militants-for-amnesty> accessed 13 April 2011. 
78 T. Hallah, ‘Niger Delta to get 10% of oil wealth’, Daily Trust (Nigeria), 20 October 2009, 
<http://www.news.dailytrust.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8113%3Anige
r-delta-to-get-10-of-oil-wealth&catid=46%3Alead-stories&Itemid=140> accessed 13 April 2011. 
98                                                                Ako & Omiunu: Amnesty in the Niger Delta 
 
from the region are all identical. Briefly, the Kaiama Declaration is the blueprint that 
contains the demands of the Ijaws and is considered as the ideological basis for their 
struggle for their economic self-determination. The resolutions contained in the 
declaration aver that: 
• all land and natural resources including mineral resources belong to the Ijaw 
communities and are the basis of their survival;  
• the oil-industry’s regulatory framework which is undemocratic, was made 
without their participation and consent and deprives them of the right to 
ownership and control of our lives and resources; 
• military forces stationed in the region should leave;  
• oil companies pollute their land; 
• they are not saboteurs and terrorists;  
• they are proud of their heritage, intend to remain neighbourly with 
surrounding ethnic nationalities and remain part of the Nigerian federation 
should be run on the basis equality and social justice.  
Based on these principles amongst others, the Ijaws resolved ‘to set up the IYC to 
coordinate the struggle of the Ijaw people for self-determination’. 
The above demands reveal that the main issues that have instigated the 
struggle for economic self-determination in the Niger Delta region include the 
government’s abrogation of land, the legal framework regulating the oil-industry, 
militarization of the oil-rich region and oil-related environmental pollution. 
Furthermore, they demand that they be recognized as a group striving for self-
determination and not as ‘saboteurs and terrorists’. From the list of demands, it 
appears that the amnesty deal may not have addressed any of the substantial 
demands as expressed in the Kaiama Declaration replicated across the ethnic-
nationalities across the oil-rich Niger Delta region. For starters, the amnesty deal is 
predicated on the notion that the beneficiaries are ‘saboteurs and terrorists’ that will 
be forgiven their misdeeds on acceptance of the terms of the deal. In fact, this is one 
of the basis upon which MEND criticize the government’s amnesty initiative. 
According to MEND, amnesty in the context of the Niger Delta militancy is a 
misplaced notion because amnesty is a lifeline for criminals not militants whose 
motivation is the emancipation and survival of their lands and people. They argue 
that it is the federal government that has committed crimes of oppression against the 
Niger Delta people and should rather, as a sign of good faith, withdraw its security 
operatives from their region and provide a comprehensive plan to improve the lives 
of the region’s inhabitants.79  
However, demilitarization of the Niger Delta as Nwajiakwu-Dahou notes is 
not in sight despite the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 
process under the amnesty initiative which is meant to rid the ex-militants of their 
weaponry retrain them and reintegrate them into society.80 Indeed, it will be 
foolhardy to suggest that militancy in the Niger Delta has ended with the amnesty 
deal but clearly, there is still a large military presence in the area that does not augur 
well for long-term peace. Interestingly, about the same time the federal government 
announced its amnesty deal, it invested N440 billion on the ‘security’ of the Niger 
Delta which afforded the Joint Task Force (JTF) the opportunity to upgrade its 
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weaponry and resolve to expel ‘militant elements’ from the region so that oil 
exploration and production activities could continue as usual.81 The situation with 
the regulatory framework; including the Land Use Act, also remains unchanged. The 
government has not given any indication that it is willing to review laws relating to 
the ownership and management of oil as well as the distribution of oil revenues. It is 
acknowledged that the much expected Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) which contains 
the provisions on payments to be made directly to the host-communities mentioned 
above will invariably revoke some existing legislation when ratified. However, the bill 
mainly addresses the federal government’s desire to remedy key fiscal, operational 
and sectoral challenges rather than addressing host-communities’ specific demands 
for abolition or review of particular ‘unfair’ laws. In the same vein, there is no 
evidence to suggest that the government intends to enforce extant laws to protect 
the Niger Delta from oil-induced pollution. If anything, the converse has been the 
case as the federal government recently postponed the date to end gas flaring in the 
region for the umpteenth time from January 2010, the flare-out date was moved to 
31st December, 2012.82 While it remains uncertain whether this new deadline will be 
adhered to, experiences from past postponements instill a sense of skepticism 
regarding both the oil-companies likely adherence to the date and the federal 
government’s enforcement of the law thereafter. 
Consequently, it is suggested that the amnesty deal is a vertical policy shift 
rather than a vertical one towards the Niger Delta peoples’ aspiration of economic 
self-determination. With the benefit of hindsight, one may argue that the federal 
government’s amnesty package is a volte face following the failure of its security 
forces to overrun the militants after increased funding and military operations in the 
Niger Delta. Indeed, the government’s lackadaisical attitude towards its post-amnesty 
commitments reinforces the above suggestion, which precipitated Nwajiakwi-Dahou 
to suggest that the amnesty deal was initiated as a process to ‘increasingly insulate oil 
companies from over-exposure to militant pressure’.83  If this is really the case, one 
might be tempted to suggest that the amnesty deal has succeeded; even if 
momentarily, to curb the hitherto widespread violent expressions for economic self-
determination. However, given the unsatisfactory implementation of the amnesty 
deal and recurring threats of violence from factions of MEND that refused to be a 
part of the amnesty deal, the final word is that violent claims for economic self-
determination in the Niger Delta are bound to recur.  
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